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INTRODUCTION
The regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad maintains its tenuous grip on power despite slow progress in the prosecution of the ongoing wars against anti-regime forces and Sunni extremists. Forces loyal to Assad are seriously reduced, and the Government of Syria (GOS) now controls only twenty-five to thirty percent of territory within the state. 1 While it once appeared that regime collapse was imminent, this premonition has been altered by the recent deployment of Russian forces to the Syrian coastal city of Latakia and an increase in support from Iran. 2 Clearly, President Assad's allies recognize that his hold on power is tenuous and that only through direct military intervention will he survive. The question that
remains unanswered is what additional actions Bashar al-Assad could take in order to assure the survival of his regime.
In the Northern Syrian area of Rojava are the Kurds whose militia, the People's Protection Unit (YPG), number approximately 40,000 and have proven to be a resilient force able to seize and defend territory from the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL).
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Largely ungoverned, Syrian Kurds exist in a legally unrecognized "pseudo-autonomous" status, fearful that the conclusion of the ongoing war will bring a return of anti-Kurdish sentiment and repression. 4 Bashar al-Assad must seize on this opportunity and actively engage with Syria's Kurdish population in order to negotiate territorial autonomy of Rojava on terms that decisively benefit the GOS' military and economic conditions.
1 Yaakov Lappin, "Russia, Iran Step up Support for Syria," Jane's Defence Weekly (September 11, 2015) . 2 Lappin, Russia, Iran Step up Support for Syria, 1-3. 3 Michael Stephens, "Analysis-YPG: The Islamic State's Worst Enemy," Jane's Defence Weekly (September 11, 2014 The author will first present an analysis of Iraqi Kurdish territorial autonomy, drawing parallels between their progress and the potential for Syria's Kurds. An argument will then be presented to detail the military gains that Bashar al-Assad may reap from a properly negotiated Kurdish autonomy. This will be followed by an analysis of the potential economic, security and international diplomatic yields that may be achieved. Finally, counter-arguments will be considered and recommendations will be outlined.
BACKGROUND
What began in March 2011 as state-tolerated freedom of expression in the wake of the regional "Arab Spring" has morphed into a complex civil war and battle against religious extremists. Bashar al-Assad's enemies now include numerous anti-regime groups, Al Qaedasponsored affiliates, ISIL, foreign fighters and exiled political groups. The most serious of these threats comes from the 20,000-30,000 strong ISIL, who is currently in control of onethird of Syrian territory.
5
Syria is also host to proxy influences from Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Once a founding member of the Arab League, Syria was ousted from the alliance in 2011
after Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown of protesters. 10 Forces loyal to Assad have experienced significant losses due to battlefield attrition, defection and desertion resulting in a reduction from 325,000 troops in 2011 to estimated an 178,000 today. 11 In a sign of his weakening position, Assad has indicated that he will focus on "critical areas" at the expense of others, and has implemented his "Army in All Corners" campaign plan, relying on a network of widely dispersed territorial outposts that do little more than emplace small static units into the far reaches of the Syrian territory. Historically speaking, Syrian Kurds are justifiably uncertain about their future. In the past the Kurdish language had been outlawed, and in 1962 the citizenship of 120,000 Kurds was revoked on the grounds that they were not legitimate Syrians. 27 The decades that followed brought discrimination and repression to the Kurdish population. The historical suppression of the Syrian Kurds looms large in their psyche and fuels fear that they will one day be re-marginalized. While the PYD is thought to number approximately 40,000 men and women, they are often poorly equipped and outgunned. 46 As negotiations commence, they should be offered significant military assistance, weapons, protective equipment, logistical aide and air cover.
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With the assurance of better support, Assad should then assign responsibility for reuniting the divided Kurdish territory to the PYD. Properly equipped and incentivized, they will act.
Assad should also insist that the PYD deny territorial access to anti-regime elements, and allow freedom of maneuver for pro-regime forces. Coordinated YPG/ SAA operations should also be planned. If properly executed, Assad could effectively sever ISIL and anti-regime lines of communication into Turkey and deny them maneuver space to the north of Aleppo.
Once Rojava is reunited, security of the northern border would be left to the YPG while Assad redeploys forces to seize Aleppo and press southward against anti-regime strongholds. Assad must then maintain control of the western population corridor, and mount an offensive to press eastward into the areas under ISIL control. 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT: TURKEY
One may argue that it would be contrary to President Assad's best interest to grant Kurdish territorial autonomy because it would damage relations with Syria's neighbor to the north.
The Government of Turkey does have a long-standing "Kurdish Problem." In the decades since the 1973 formation of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), there has been much mutual bloodshed between the government of Turkey and the PKK. 55 The PKK has been implicated in several attacks on civilian and unarmed military garrisons. 56 For its part, Turkey has arrested PKK members, conducted targeted killings and has longstanding discriminatory laws that forbid the expression of Kurdish culture. Because of their extremist tactics, Turkey and the rest of North Atlantic Treaty Organization have recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization. Turkey continues aerial bombing of PKK as part of the American led air campaign against ISIL. 57 They also choose to retain the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah
Ocalan. As a sign that neither side is backing down, the PKK declared an autonomous region in the Turkish Dersim province in August of this year, a claim flatly rejected by the Turkish government. 
